Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction Behaviour in Shipping Industry under Government Reward and Punishment
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To promote the low-carbon transformation of the shipping industry, this study explores the impact of the government’s reward and punishment mechanisms on carbon reduction behaviours in the shipping industry. Specifically, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, shipping companies and port enterprises, and examines the factors involved. The main results of this study are as follows. First, government reward and punishment mechanisms have a significant effect on the sustainable development of the shipping industry. The probability of shipping companies and port enterprises adopting carbon emission reduction behaviour will rise when the government effectively implements the reward and punishment mechanism. Second, the regulatory cost has an important influence on the decision of the government. With a decrease in the cost of conducting government regulation, the government is inclined to adopt active regulation strategies. Third, the short operational time has adverse effects on the green transition of the shipping industry. However, when the ships’ operational time is long, shipping companies are inclined to adopt proactive carbon reduction strategies. Besides, shipping companies tend to prioritise local port enterprises for the refuelling of clean energy ships. Therefore, the probability of port enterprises building clean energy refuelling stations will rise when shipping companies choose to adopt clean energy ships. The aim of this study is to offer policy suggestions for mitigating carbon emissions in the shipping industry and to help stakeholders choose the relatively optimal strategy.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Taiyang Li, Fangwei Zhang, Minhui Jiao, Zhu Han, Mengchen Wang
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