Understanding the Impact of Integration Strategy of Ride-Hailing Platforms on Traveller’s Choice Behaviour

Ke LU; Yunlin WEI; Heng DU

doi:10.7307/ptt.v36i6.753

Authors

Ke LU Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, School of Management Science and Engineering
Yunlin WEI Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, School of Management Science and Engineering
Heng DU Nanjing Institute of Technology, School of Economics & Management

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.7307/ptt.v36i6.753

Keywords:

ride-hailing service, integration, traveller behaviour, choice behaviour, evolutionary game

Abstract

With the rapid expansion of ride-hailing services, it has gradually become a new travel choice for urban residents. Various research studies have focused on market relationships and platform strategies from the perspective of platform competition. However, little research has been studying issues related to the platform integration of ride-hailing services from the corporate perspective. Based on an analysis of integration modes and travellers’ behavioural factors, we established an evolutionary game model to study travellers’ choice behaviour under the integration of ride-hailing platforms. Furthermore, this study employed methods of model deduction and numerical study. The findings indicate the following. (1) When the travel risk associated with platform integration is high, travellers are less likely to choose ride-hailing services, and the integration strategy of ride-hailing platforms will not be pursued. (2) Ride-hailing platforms tend to interconnect with larger-scale platforms. (3) As the negative effect of perceived sacrifice decreases, ride-hailing platforms are more likely to interconnect with other platforms, and travellers are more inclined to choose ride-hailing services. (4) A higher cost of platform integration will decrease the probability of ride-hailing platforms adopting an integration strategy, but it will not significantly impact travellers’ behaviour.

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