Understanding the Impact of Invalid Parking Areas on Shared Bicycle Parking Governance Systems
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The existence of invalid parking areas significantly contributes to the disorderly parking of shared bicycles. A thorough investigation into the effectiveness of various management mechanisms in addressing this issue is crucial for promoting the sustainable development of the shared bicycle market. This study establishes an evolutionary game model among three stakeholders: the government, enterprises and users. The model integrates the rate of invalid parking areas and governmental supervision methodologies, which have been largely overlooked in existing literature. The strategy stability of each stakeholder is analysed using the Lyapunov discriminant method. Furthermore, the impact of various parameters on the evolutionary process is examined through numerical simulations. The findings indicate the following. (1) Differing initial levels of willingness among stakeholders significantly affect both the speed and trajectory of system evolution. (2) The primary objective of effectively managing shared bicycle parking is to enhance the efficiency of enterprise-constructed parking areas. (3) Increasing government fines while improving enterprise reward and punishment mechanisms proves to be an effective strategy for fostering a healthier shared bicycle parking governance system. These results provide actionable recommendations for regulating uncontrolled shared bicycle parking and optimising urban transportation resource utilisation within a more realistic modelling framework.
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